Title: All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
Author: Stephen Kinzer
Genre: non-fiction, American history, Middle Eastern history, Iranian history, politics
**This review has been adapted from an essay I wrote for my Modern World Civilization class**
Before I read All
the Shah’s Men, my personal knowledge about Iran was very limited. I knew
that the Shah had been overthrown in the 1970s, with help from the United
States government, and that the Ayatollah was put in place as ruler in the
Shah’s stead. I have also hard about the American hostage crisis that took
place in Iran in the late 1970s, but I have not completed any in-depth research
about either event. Before reading this book, I had never heard about the 1953
coup in Iran (orchestrated with assistance from the U.S. government). I knew
that Iran and the United States have had unfriendly diplomatic relations for
decades and this book explains the beginnings of this animosity. I have
described the events of this book to a few other people and they had never
heard of the 1953 Iranian coup either.
Iran, like the Congo, was a victim of European
imperialism. Africa was carved and divvied up between European powers in 1885
at the Berlin Conference, with no African input. Iran suffered a similar fate
in 1907 when Great Britain and Russia met in Saint Petersburg and divided
Iranian soil between them, with no Iranian say-so in the matter (I see a
disturbing pattern here….): “Britain assumed control of the southern provinces,
while Russia took the north. A strip between the two zones was declared
neutral, meaning that Iranians could rule there as long as they did not act against
the interests of their privileged guests” (38). Britain was interested in Iran
because of its proximity to India and the Russians were also interested in Iran
since it was adjacent to its southern border. This paternalistic attitude
towards Iran was indicative of the imperialistic and condescending attitudes
many powerful Westerners held towards non-Western peoples and societies.
Iran’s
relationship with Great Britain can be traced back to numerous bad business and
economic decisions made by Nasir al-Din Shah, who “came up with the idea of
raising cash by selling Iran’s patrimony to foreign companies and governments”
(31). The Shah’s plan was implemented after he and his hundreds of children had
bankrupted the country with their lavish lifestyles. Soon after the Shah put
Iran’s various industries up for sale, the British obtained exclusive control
of Iran’s agriculture, mining, railroad, banking, and tobacco industries.
Muzzafar al-Din Shah continued his father’s poor business legacy with the sale
of Iran’s natural gas and oil industry to British banker William Knox D’arcy in
1901. With the growing popularity of automobiles in the early twentieth
century, the British realized if they “could not find oil somewhere, they would
no longer be able to rules the waves or much of anything else” (48).
After
the confirmed discovery of oil in Iran, the British created the Anglo-Persian
Oil Company “to take control of oil exploration and development in Iran” (49)
and to enrich British coffers. Unfortunately, only the British were enjoying
the perks of the booming petroleum profits. While British petroleum workers
lived in individual, comfortable housing with access to many amenities (shops,
theaters, swimming pools, etc.), the lower class Iranian workers enjoyed no
such luxuries and “lived in slums and long dormitories with only primitive
sanitation” (50). Iranians viewed the Shah as a literal sellout and his most
vocal critic was Mohammad Mossadegh who despised the British takeover of his
country: “If bringing prosperity to the country through the work of other
nations were of benefit to the people, every nation would have invited
foreigners into its home. If subjugation were beneficial, no subjugated country
would have tried to liberate itself through bloody wars and heavy losses” (59).
The British government offered a Supplemental Agreement in 1949 that guaranteed
increased petroleum royalties, more Iranian promotions, and less drilling. The
Iranian legislative assembly debated for months on whether to accept this deal
and things were coming to a stalemate when the Iranian government learned that
Saudi Arabia had reached an agreement with Aramco to split all oil profits on a
50/50 basis. When a similar idea was floated to the British government
regarding Iran, they rejected the idea of an even split of profits (77). In
Iran, calls for nationalization of the country’s oil field divided legislators,
angered the British, and was looked upon favorably by the Truman administration
who felt that “if the United States did not align itself with nationalist
forces in the developing world, those forces would turn toward Marxism and the
Soviet Union” (88).
Mohammad
Reza Shah officially dismantled the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on May 1, 1951,
and created the National Iranian Oil Company; the British were furious since
they considered Iranian oil, found on Iranian land to be British property. The
Truman administration “worried that the argument between the United States and
Britain over how to deal with Mossadegh might spiral out of control and split
the Atlantic alliance” (99). During this time of heightened tensions with the
Soviet Union, the United States wanted to maintain as many alliances as
possible to stop the spread of communism.
When
outright political demands and hostility refused to sway the pro-nationalist
Iranians, the British took to more subtle forms of economic sabotage: British
refinery managers refused to repair or replace equipment and refused to
properly train new managers; the British persuaded their western European
allies to deny visas to petroleum workers applying for relocation to Iran. In a
desperate move, the British government took their case to the United Nations to
justify their monopoly on Iran’s oil industry. That tactic failed as well but a
change in the leadership and diplomatic styles in the American and British
governments in 1952-1953 brought the United States, Great Britain, and Iran on
a collision course. The United States and Great Britain co-authored plans for a
coup to overthrow Mossadegh titled Operation Ajax. “One looked forward to
recovering its oil concession. The other saw a chance to deliver a devastating
blow against communism” (164). Intelligence operatives from both countries used
their extensive network of local contacts to start protests and
counter-protests to keep the Iranian government and people distracted from the
true architects of the imminent coup. After Mossadegh’s overthrow, the British
government tried to reinsert itself on the Iranian oilfields but ironically
“the logic of power dictated that since the United States had done the dirty
work of overthrowing Mossadegh, American companies should share the spoils”
(195).
From
the 1950s American perspective, the overthrow of Mossadegh and reinstatement of
the Shah appeared to be a success but six decades later the world is paying the
price of American and British greed and demand for oil that was deemed more
important than Iranian democracy. The proverb “Oh what a tangled web we weave when
we first practice to deceive” is an apropos viewpoint of the 1953 coup and its
after effects. The Middle East is in a constant state of political, economic,
and religious turmoil, most Iranians hate the Americans for butting into
situations in which they weren’t asked to assist, and the West has
inadvertently contributed to the spread of terrorism. Some members of the
British and the US governments still subscribed to imperialism in the 1950s and
this narrowmindedness and ethnocentrism blinded government leaders to the
long-term consequences of interfering in another country’s politics and
industry. The Western powers did not realize that interfering in Iran would
have negative ripple effects in a globalized world. I think the worst thing
about this is that the United States still has not learned its lesson in
orchestrating coups. The US was also involved in disastrous diplomatic
incidents in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Iran again in 1979; this is why studying
history is so important- so we don’t make the same mistakes as our predecessors!